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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act1 amended the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)2 by promulgating a code of unfair labor
practice regulations which pertained to labor orga-
nizations.3 One of these new provisions, section 8(b)(1)(A), 4 pro-
hibited unions from restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed them under the NLRA.5 Soon after
t Lecturer in Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.S. 1967, M. Ind. & Lab.
Rel. 1968, Cornell University; J.D. 1971, University of Michigan. Member, California
Bar.
1 Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150 et seq. (1970) (Wagner Act).
3 Prior to the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, only the conduct of employers was
restricted by the federal labor statute.
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), which provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair'labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
Concerning the rights protected by the NLRA, see note 5 infra. For the statutory
definition of "employee," see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
'Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), which defines the scope of
guaranteed rights, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively-through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized'in section 158(a)(3) of this tile.
Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), permits a labor organization and an
employer to enter into a collective bargaining agreement which contains a union-security
provision requiring employees to become union members within a specified period of
time as a condition of continued employment. For the text of § 8(a)(3), see note 114 infra.
But see Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) (employees may not be discharged pursuant to a
valid union-security provision so long as they merely tender their union dues and fees,
although they refuse to attend union meetings or take a membership oath). See Toner,
The Union Shop. Under Taft-Hartley, 5 LAB. L.J. 552 (1954); 52 MICH. L. REv. 619 (1954).
This statutory interpretation was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), in which the Court noted that "[M]ember-
ship, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may ... be conditioned only
upon payment of fees and dues. 'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled
down to its financial core." 373 U.S. at 742. This statutory construction was based upon
legislative history indicating that Congress was concerned only with preventing em-
ployees from deriving substantial benefits from union representation without having to
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the enactment of this section, Professor Cox predicted future
interpretative difficulties:
Section 8(b)(1) may plunge the [Labor] Board into a
dismal swamp of uncertainty. Its vagueness alone, not to
mention the broad interpretations put upon it during
the debates in Congress, encourages the filing of great
numbers of [unfair labor practice] charges as weapons
in fighting the unionization of a plant. A long period of
uncertainty and heavy volume of litigation will be neces-
sary before the questions of interpretation can be
resolved.
6
This prophetic evaluation has certainly proved correct with re-
spect to union discipline of members.
In the recent Boeing decision, 7 the Supreme Court held that
where a labor organization imposes an otherwise valid dis-
ciplinary fine upon one of its members, it is not the obligation of
the National Labor Relations Board to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of the amount of that fine, since this issue is not relevant to
a section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice charge. This article will
examine that opinion in light of both the congressional intent
underlying the pertinent Taft-Hartley amendments and the im-
plications which can be derived from prior Supreme Court
pronouncements pertaining to union disciplinary action. Since
the writer disagrees with the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court, an alternative approach will be suggested, and the
ramifications of this contrary approach will be analyzed, in an
effort to assuage the concerns underlying the Supreme Court's
evaluation. However, before dealing specifically with the Boeing
decision's reasonableness question, it will be useful to summarize
briefly the general principles regarding the legality of union
discipline.
II. GENERAL PROPRIETY OF UNION DISCIPLINE
Although the NLRA did not impose any restrictions upon
union activity until 1947,8 the discipline of union members by
accept any of the financial obligations of union membership. See Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954). See also Evans v. American Fed'n of Television Artists,
354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (concerning the right of a union to require member-
ship by television and radio commentators in light of first amendment considerations).
6 Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33
(1947).
7 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973). Booster Lodge 405 of the International
Association of Machinists was the labor organization involved.
8 See notes 1-5 supra & accompanying text.
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labor organizations was not wholly unregulated. State courts had
been adjudicating internal union disputes for over fifty years. 9
However, such state court intervention was generally not perva-
sive. As Professor Summers' research indicated, 10 most state
courts did not demonstrate much antagonism to union dis-
cipline, as they upheld penalties for such activities as working
during a strike" or in a nonunion shop,' 2 working for substan-
dard wages,'13 or engaging in unauthorized strikes' 4 or miscon-
duct on the job.' 5 Only in extreme cases was the union dis-
ciplinary action overturned.'
6
It is not difficult to understand the hesitancy of state tribu-
nals to impose limitations upon the freedom of labor organiza-
tions to discipline their members for infractions of union rules.
Discipline is the criminal law of union government. It is
the critical device for maintaining internal order, en-
forcing obligations of membership, and compelling
adherence to union standards in employment. It
strengthens the union as an effective bargaining rep-
resentative and is essential for internal democracy.'
7
On the other hand, union discipline may "be used to stifle the
democratic process by punishing those who criticize and retaliat-
ing against those who oppose."' 8 Following the enactment of the
NLRA, it became apparent that discipline could also be utilized
to discourage members from exercising the rights provided them
by that Act. Because of this, and particularly after the adoption
of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA proscribing un-
fair labor practices by labor organizations, it became incumbent
upon the Labor Board and the federal courts to define the
permissible scope of union discipline in relation to the exercise
of protected section 7 rights.
9 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Courts]; see cases cited id. n.3. Regarding general union
disciplinary practices, see P. TAFr, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS
117-80 (1954); Summers, Disciplinary Power of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950).
10 Courts, supra note 9, at 188-89 & nn. 70-75.
"See, e.g., Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 224 N.Y.S. 193 (1927).
12 See, e.g., Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225, 109 N.E. 244 (1915); Watson v.
Victory, 127 N.Y.L.J. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
13 See, e.g., Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y.S. 701 (1932); Drazen v.
Curby, 172 App. Div. 417, 158 N.Y.S. 507 (1916).
14See, e.g., Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
15 See, e.g., Austin v. Dutcher, 56 App. Div. 393, 67 N.Y.S. 819 (1900) (stealing);
Perez v. Curran, File No. 3144/57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1957) (fighting on
shipboard).
16See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1078,
1083-84 (1951).
" Courts, supra note 9, at 178.
181d.
UNION DISCIPLINARY FINES
A. Permissible Scope of Union Discipline Under the NLRA
As early as 1954, in Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 19 the
Labor Board was called upon to decide whether a union violated
section 8(b)(1)(A)20 when it imposed a disciplinary fine upon a
member because of his refusal to attend union meetings and
engage in picket duty during a strike.2 ' In his intermediate
report, the trial examiner emphasized the fact that the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A) expressly indicated that this section "shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein," and he concluded that the union disciplinary action did
not violate the Act.22 He reasoned that "Congressional recogni-
tion of a labor organization's right to make its own rules pre-
sumes, of course, its right to invoke them-except where the
implementing of such rules is expressly prohibited, as in the case
of affecting an employee's employment rights. ' 23 The Labor
Board accepted this analysis, as it cursorily concluded that "the
proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) precludes any such [NLRB] inter-
ference with the internal affairs of a labor organization. 24
The Supreme Court did not become directly involved with
union discipline until 1967, in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufactur-
ing Co.2 5 In Allis-Chalmers the court was required to determine
whether a union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) when it imposed
disciplinary fines upon members who performed strikebreaking
19 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
20 For the text of § 8(b)(1)(A), see note 4 supra.
21 The trial examiner indicated that his research had not disclosed any NLRB
precedent in this area. 109 N.L.R.B. at 738.
22 Id.
23 Id. It is clear that a labor organization may not lawfully utilize disciplinary action to
affect the employment conditions or rights of the member in question. Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1910), prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any employee on account of any union activity or lack of union activity-except
for an employee's failure to tender his union dues and fees pursuant to a valid
union-security provision in the applicable collective-bargaining agreement. Furthermore,
§ 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), prohibits a labor organization from causing or
attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against any employee in violation of §
8(a)(3). For the text of §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), see note 114 in ra. It is therefore established
that a union may not enforce any disciplinary action against a member, except where
such action relates to the member's failure to tender the requisite dues and fees pursuant
to a valid union-security agreement, by inducing or attempting to induce the employer to
discriminate against the employee in regard to employment conditions. See, e.g., Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced per curiam, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952).
24 109 N.L.R.B. at 729. It is obvious that the Labor Board's conclusionary statement
presumed the very answer it was actually called upon to provide. Although the proviso
may well have indicated a congressional desire to avoid interference with truly internal
affiirs of labor unions, the NLRB's analysis failed to explain the distinction between
internal and external concerns for § 8(b)(1)(A) purposes-other than where employment
rights were directly affected. See note 91 infra.
22 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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work during an economic strike.26 Although a divided Supreme
Court upheld the right, under the NLRA, of a labor organiza-
tion to impose such fines, it utilized reasoning which differed
substantially from the rationale which had been used by the
Labor Board in its Minneapolis Star decision.27
The Allis-Chalmers opinion noted that "[i]t is highly unrealis-
tic to regard § 8(b)(1), and particularly its words 'restrain or
coerce,' as precisely and unambiguously covering the union
conduct involved in this case," and concluded that "recourse to
legislative history to determine the sense in which Congress used
[those] words is not foreclosed. 28 It emphasized that "labor
legislation is peculiarly the product of legislative compromise of
strongly held views . . . and that legislative history may not be
disregarded merely because it is arguable that a provision may
unambiguously embrace conduct called in question. '29 The
Court then undertook a detailed analysis of the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act amendments
to the NLRA, and it concluded that Congress did not intend to
prohibit union disciplinary action against strikebreaking mem-
bers by the prohibition against "restraint" or "coercion" con-
tained in section 8(b)(1)(A). 30 However, the Court did not rely
exclusively upon the legislative history.
The Allis-Chalmers majority found additional support for its
interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) in what it perceived to be the
general policy considerations underlying the enactment of the
NLRA in 1935. It noted:
National labor policy has been built on the premise
that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization freely chosen by the ma-
jority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the
most effective means of bargaining for improvements in
wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy there-
fore extinguishes the individual employee's power to
order his own relations with his employer and creates a
26 The Allis-Chalmers situation differed from that in Minneapolis Star in that in the
former the union instituted state court collection actions to enforce the disciplinary fines.
27 Because of the analytical approach undertaken by the Supreme Court in Allis-
Chalmers, it was not required to resolve the issue whether the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A)
protected union disciplinary actions from being considered unfair labor practices. See 388
U.S. at 192 n.29.
28 1d. at 179.
29id See National woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1967).
30 388 U.S. at 183-95. For another detailed analysis of the legislative history pertain-
ing to § 8(b)(1)(A), see National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971. 982-87 (1948),
enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950). Regarding the
questionable value of resort to legislative history in the interpretation of the congressional
intent underlying § 8(b)(1)(A), see notes 93-113 infra & accompanying text.
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power vested in the chosen representative to act in the
interests of all employees. 'Congress has seen fit to
clothe the bargaining representative with powers com-
parable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it repre-
sents .... '31
The majority further recognized:
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the
power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its
[sic] status under that policy through reasonable disci-
pline of members who violate rules and regulations
governing membership. That power is particularly vital
when the members engage in strikes. The economic
strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in
labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms,
and '[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essen-
tial if the union is to be an effective bargaining
agent .... .2
In light of these strong policy considerations, the Allis-Chalmers
majority decided that its interpretation of the congressional
intent underlying section 8(b)(1)(A) was correct.
3 3
In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the right of unions to impose and enforce reasonable fines
against members who violate valid union regulations. In Scofield
v. NLRB, 34 the Court was presented with a situation in which a
labor organization had attempted through state court actions to
collect fines which it had imposed upon members who had
violated a union rule relating to work production ceilings. The
Court noted that under Allis-Chalmers and related Labor Board
decisions, "[section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a
properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest,
impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and
is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule. '3 5 The Scofield Court con-
31 388 U.S. at 180.
32 Id. at 181.
33 For an excellent critical evaluation of the Allis-Chalmers decision, see Christensen,
Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in an Industrial Democracy, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 227, 264-78 (1968). See also Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The NLRA
and Union Disciplinary Power, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 681 (1970); Gould, Some Limitations Upon
Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers,
1970 DUKE L.J. 1067; Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers,
Marine Workers and Scofield, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 187 (1969); Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv.
1094 (1968); Comment, 8(b)(1)(A) Limitations upon the Right of a Union to Fine Its Members,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1966).
34 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
35Id. at 430.
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cluded that since the union rule in question "left the collective
bargaining process unimpaired, breached no collective contract,
required no pay for unperformed services, induced no discrimi-
nation by the employer against any class of employees, and
represent[ed] no dereliction by the union of its duty of fair
representation," the enforcement of that rule by disciplinary
fines did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A). 36
In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers37 the Supreme
Court also upheld the right of unions to impose discipline upon
members for violations of legitimate union regulations which did
not conflict with any specific federal labor policies. However, in
that decision the Court expressly recognized that some limita-
tions upon union disciplinary action do emanate from the
NLRA.
B. Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the NLRA
Although the Labor Board had previously recognized the
existence of some substantive limitations upon union discipline
under the NLRA,38 it was not until the Marine Workers decision
that the Supreme Court provided its imprimatur to the NLRB's
statutory interpretation. In Marine Workers, the Supreme Court
upheld the Labor Board's determination that a labor organiza-
tion violates section 8(b)(1)(A) when it expels a member for
failing to exhaust all available internal union remedies before
filing an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The Court
noted that while "[section] 8(b)(1)(A) assures a union freedom of
self-regulation where its legitimate internal affairs are con-
cerned, . . . other considerations of public policy come into'
play"39 when a union penalizes a member for filing an unfair
labor practice charge. Under the circumstances presented in the
Marine Workers case, the Court indicated that these public policy
considerations included the necessity for free access to the Labor
Board unimpeded by any union interference. 40 The Court un-
fortunately did not delineate other areas in which policy consid-
erations might impose restrictions upon the right of unions to
discipline their members. Nevertheless, subsequent Labor Board
decisions have provided some assistance in this regard.
' 6 1d. at 436.
37 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
"See, e.g., Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) (labor organization
violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by imposing a disciplinary fine upon a member for filing an unfair
labor practice charge with teN RB before exhausting internal remedies). The rationale
of this opinion was expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Marine Workers.
"391 U.S. at 424.4 0 Id. at 424-25.
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In Local 12419, UMW,4 1 the NLRB held that a union violates
section 8(b)(1)(A) when it fines members for crossing a sister
union's lawful picket line, where the contract in existence be-
tween the picketed employer and the labor organization impos-
ing the discipline contained an applicable no-strike clause. Policy
considerations favoring such no-strike arrangements were found
to outweigh the right of a union to enforce its internal
regulations.42 In a later 1969 decision, the NLRB was faced with
an even more difficult balancing problem.
Four years earlier, in Tawas Tube Products, Inc.,4 the Labor
Board recognized the right of a labor organization to expel a
member for having filed a decertification petition seeking to
terminate the representative status of the union." However, in
International Molders Local 125, 45 another case involving union
disciplinary action against a member for filing a decertification
petition, the NLRB distinguished a disciplinary fine from an
expulsion. It indicated the necessity "of reconciling the public
policy of protecting access to the Board with a union's right to
prescribe its own rules respecting 'the acquisition or retention of
membership.' "46 The Labor Board noted that
[i]n the case of a decertification petition, the employee
seeks to attack the very existence of the union as an
institution,47 and unless the union can expel the
member who seeks its destruction, "during the pre-
election campaign, the member could campaign against
the union while remaining a member and therefore
privy to the union's strategy and tactics. 48
The NLRB therefore concluded that while "the union needs
[the] power of expulsion in order to defend its status as bargain-
ing representative, ' 49 it does not require the authority to fine a
41 176 N.L.R.B. 628 (1969).
42 But see Machinists Lodge 284, 190 N.L.R.B. 208 (1971), enforced in part & remanded
for determination of reasonableness offines, 472 F.2d 416 (1972) (upheld similar fines, based
upon the fact that the no-strike agreement which existed between the picketed employer
and the disciplining union specifically allowed employees to honor legitimate picket lines
against that employer).
43 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
4' The Labor Board's position was upheld in Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
45 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971).
46Id. at 208. The Molders decision is quite noteworthy, since it at least implicitly
recognized a distincoion for some purposes between expulsions, which fall within the
literal language of the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), and disciplinary fines, which do not. Cf.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
17 The Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 41 I(a)(2) (1970), specifically recognizes "the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility
of every member toward the organization as an institution . .....
48 178 N.L.R.B. at 208.
4"Id. "In short, where the union member is seeking to decertify the union ... the
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member who has filed a decertification petition, since a fine is
merely punitive, and not, like expulsion, defensive. 50  The
union's imposition of a disciplinary fine upon the member in
question was thus determined to constitute an 8(b)(1)(A) viola-
tion.
51
One other limitation upon the right of labor organizations to
impose disciplinary fines. should be noted. In the Granite State
decision,52 the Supreme Court held that a union may only
impose discipline upon persons who are. actually members of
that organization at the time the acts complained of are
performed. 53 Therefore, when a member effectively resigns
from his union before engaging in activity contrary to the labor
organization's rules, he may not lawfully be fined by that
union.
54
C. The Reasonableness of Union Fines Under the NLRA
Although the Labor Board and the Supreme Court have
imposed several restrictions upon the right of labor organiza-
tions to fine their members for conduct violative of union obliga-
tions, they have both determined that the reasonableness of the
amount of a fine is not relevant to the issue whether there is an
unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Since this Article will be
primarily concerned with the propriety of this position, it is
necessary to examine carefully the evolution of this doctrine.
public policy against permitting a union to penalize a member because he seeks the aid of
the Board should give way to the union's right to self-defense." Id. at 209.5 0 1d. at 209.-The NLRB also recognized that where a member has filed a
decertification petition in an effort to eliminate the union as his bargaining representa-
tive, he has indicated such a lack of regard for his union membership that his expulsion
from that organization would not effectively deter him from resorting to the Labor
Board's processes. Id. at 208.
51 The Labor Board's decision was enforced by the Seventh Circuit, which accepted
the NLRB's distinction between defensive and retaliatory disciplinary action. NLRB v.
International Molders Local 125, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971). Accord, Tri-Rivers Marine
Eng'rs Union, 189 N.L.R.B. 838, in which the Labor Board held that while an incumbent
union violated the NLRA by imposing a fine upon a member for soliciting authorization
cards in favor of an election petition by an outside labor organization, that same union
did not violate the Act when it threatened to expel the disloyal member unless he paid
the fine. See also Note, Union Disciplinary Power and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act: Limitations on the Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 584 (1966).
52 NLRB v. Granite State joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
53 The Court did not decide upon the authority of a union to impose discipline upon
an individual who was a "member" only to the extent of tendering his dues and fees
without formally affirming his allegiance to the organization. Since collection actions are
generally founded upon principles of contract law, it would be difficult to imagine a court
enforcing a fine against an individual who never assented to the obligations contained in
the union's by-laws and constitution, but only paid dues and fees pursuant to an
enforceable union-security contract. This analysis is supported by the recognition of the
Granite State Court that "the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater
than the union-member contract." Id. at 217.
54 Booster Lodge 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973). See Note, 72 COLUM. L.
REv. 1272 (1972).
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The Labor Board was first called upon to determine the
effect of the amount of a disciplinary fine upon a section
8(b)(1)(A) complaint in Machinists, Lodge 504. 55 A union member
had been fined $500 for working during an authorized economic
strike, and the union had obtained a state court judgment
against him for $528.56 The member thereafter filed an
8(b)(1)(A) charge alleging, inter alia, that the unreasonably large
nature of the union's fine57 constituted a violation of the NLRA.
The Labor Board emphasized "the repeated refrain throughout
the [legislative] debates on § 8(b)(1)(A) and other sections that
Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the
internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a
union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment
status.158 It therefore stated that it could not "conclude that
Congress nonetheless intended to have the Board regulate the
size of [union] fines ind establish standards with respect to their
reasonableness.
59
In the subsequent Booster Lodge case,6 ° the Labor Board
reaffirmed its Arrow Development position. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed this
portion of the Labor Board's decision, and held instead that the
NLRB is obligated to consider the reasonableness of the amount
of a union disciplinary fine when that issue is appropriately
raised in an unfair labor practice proceeding.6'
However, the Supreme Court rejected the District of
Columbia Court's analysis in favor of the Labor Board's
position.62 The Court indicated that
[t]he underlying basis for the holdings of Allis-Chalmers
and Scofield was not that reasonable fines were noncoer-
55 185 N.L.R.B. 365, enforcement denied sub nom. O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 61 in ra.
" This amount represented $500 on the debt, $26.50 in costs and $1.50 for issuance
of the writ of execution. 185 N.L.R.B. at 366 n.1.
The strikebreaking member had earned a total of $610.62 during the strike, with
net earnings of $511.33. Id. at 365. Thus the amount of the state courtjudgment actually
exceeded the worker's net earnings.
"1Id. at 367.
'9Id. at 368. The Board also noted:
Where Congress desires that the Board make this type of determination, it has
said so. Thus, Sec. 8(b)(5) of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1970)] authorizes
the Board to decide whether or not initiation fees charged of employees
required to join a labor organization under a union-security clause are excessive
and discriminatory.
Id. at 268 n.19.
"Booster Lodge 405, 1AM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970).
61 Booster Lodge 405, 1AM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Accord, Morton
Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972).
62 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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cive under the language of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, but
was instead that those provisions [sic] were not intended
by Congress to apply to the imposition by the union of
fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship
and not otherwise prohibited by the Act.
63
It further noted that "[ilssues as to the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness or [union] fines must be decided upon the basis
of the law of contracts, voluntary associations, or such other
principles of law as may be applied in a forum competent to
adjudicate the issue. '6 4 Since it believed that state tribunals,
rather than the NLRB, were best equipped to resolve these
traditional legal questions, it concluded that the Labor Board was
not obligated by section 8(b)(1)(A) to consider the question of
reasonableness in an unfair labor practice case.
These Labor Board and Supreme Court decisions constitute
a clear departure from prior holdings pertaining to the union
discipline area, and do not conform to the Congressional intent
underlying the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to
the NLRA. Furthermore, they have myopically ignored the
realities of industrial dynamics. Labor organizations have already
imposed disciplinary fines of up to $14,000 upon individual
members, 65 and it should be obvious to the most casual student
of labor relations that the possibility of a judgment of such
magnitude against any but the most extraordinary union worker
would have a substantial chilling effect upon that person's exer-
cise of his rights.6 6 In addition, it is not difficult to perceive the
significant impact which such a threat would have upon other
workers who might be contemplating the exercise of their
rights.67 It is therefore imperative that the rationale of the Labor
Board and Supreme Court decisions be carefully analyzed. 68
631d. at 72.
641Id. at 74.
65 See Atieson, supra note 33, at 722; Christensen, supra note 33, at 276.
66 The fact that the fines imposed might not be collectible in a subsequent state court
action due to their unreasonable nature would not really detract from their coerciveness
at the time of their imposition. See text accompanying note 111 infra; Local 167,
Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538, 542 ( th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
905 (1970); NLRB v. American Bakery Workers, Local 300, 411 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th
Cir. 1969). Concerning the reluctance of many state courts to inquire into the reason-
ableness of fines in collection actions, see notes 147-51 infra & accompanying text.
67 That such persons may technically avoid the possibility of enforceable disciplinary
fines by resigning from the union before enaging in the contemplated activity, see notes
52-54 supra &accompanying text, is not really a meaningful answer. Only an unusually
well-informed union member would even be aware of his right in this regard. Further-
more, the member may not be able to afford the loss of the important monetary benefits
(e.g., pension and health insurance rights) incidental to membership which would be
incurred by resignation from the union.
68 Although the mere imposition of an excessively large fine upon a member who has
exercised some right protected by the NLRA might certainly have some adverse effect
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III. ANALYSIS OF LABOR BOARD AND SUPREME
COURT REASONING
To evaluate the reasoning of the Labor Board and Supreme
Court concerning the reasonableness issue, the rationales of the
Allis-Chalmers, Scofield and Marine Workers decisions will be ex-
amined, and the legislative history of the pertinent NLRA provi-
sions reviewed. Furthermore, the effect of the proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A) upon this question must be evaluated, along with a
consideration of the implications which may reasonably be de-
rived from other relevant NLRA sections.
A. Relevance of "Reasonableness" Language
in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
In the Allis-Chalmers decision, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized the right of unions to utilize disciplinary fines en-
forceable in court in lieu of the more Draconian alternative of
expulsion. The Court noted:
It is no answer that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) preserves
to the union the power to expel the offending member.
Where the union is strong and membership therefore
valuable, to require expulsion of the member visits a far
more severe penalty upon the member than a reasonable
fine.
6 9
The Court similarly indicated that "the proviso preserves the
right of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion
.... "70 This reasoning implicitly recognized that for a disci-
plinary fine to be less coercive than expulsion, the amount
exacted must be "reasonable," for it is intuitively obvious that the
enforcement of an unreasonably large fine would visit a substan-
tially greater burden upon an individual than would mere
expulsion.
71
The Allis-Chalmers opinion's preoccupation with "reason-
upon the disciplined individual, as well as upon others, such union action is protected by
the language of the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) so long as actual or threatened expulsion is the
only means being contemplated by the labor organization to enforce its fine. See note 4
supra. For this reason, the discussion of this Article is concerned only with the situation
where a union has imposed an unreasonably large fine which it either has sought or
threatened to enforce through court action.
69 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 183 (1967) (emphasis supplied).7 0Id. at 191-92.
7 The Allis-Chalmers Court did not resolve the reasonableness issue since it was not
presented with the argument that the fines in question were unreasonably large. Id. at
192-93 n.30. Furthermore, it indicated that "[t]here may be concern that court enforce-
ment may permit the collection of unreasonably large fines. However, even were there
evidence that Congress shaiiethis concern, this would not justify reading the Act also to
bar court enforcement of reasonable fines." Id. (footnote omitted).
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ableness" was shared by both concurring Justice White and
dissenting Justice Black. In his concurring opinion, Justice White
observed:
[S]ince expulsion would in many cases-certainly in this
one involving a strong union-be a far more coercive
technique for enforcing a union rule and for collecting
a reasonable fine than the threat of court enforcement,
there is no basis for thinking that Congress, having
accepted expulsion as a permissible technique to en-
force a rule in derogation of § 7 rights, nevertheless
intended to bar enforcement by another method [court
action] which may be far less coercive. 2
Justice Black's dissent echoed the same refrain when it sum-
marized its interpretation of the majority holding: "[T]he Court's
holding boils down to this: a court-enforced reasonable fine for
nonparticipation in a strike does not 'restrain or coerce' an
employee in the exercise of his right not to participate in the
strike. ' 73 The Supreme Court's emphasis upon reasonableness
was continued in the Scofield decision, in which it noted that
under Allis-Chalmers, "[a] union rule, duly adopted and not the
arbitrary fiat of a union officer, forbidding the crossing of a
picket line during a strike [is] . . .enforceable against voluntary
union members by expulsion or a reasonable fine.
7 4
The frequent mention of the reasonableness requirement in
the Supreme Court's Allis-Chalmers and Scofield opinions was the
primary consideration which induced the District of Columbia
Circuit to reject the Labor Board's position in the Booster Lodge
case.
75
In light of the [Supreme] Court's emphasis on the
requirement of "reasonable fines" if a union is to avoid
a violation of the Act ...we must conclude that the
imposition of an unreasonably large fine, at least where
72 d. at 198 (emphasis supplied).73
1d. at 200-01 (emphasis supplied). It is interesting to note that even the attorney
who argued the Allis-Chalmers case before the Supreme Court on behalf of the union
recognized the "reasonableness" limitation in the Court's opinion. In a subsequent article,
he indicated that Allis-Chalmers only determined that "a union suit to collect a reasonable
fine imposed on a member for violating a 'no strikebreaking' rule does not violate section
8(b)(1).' Silard, supra note 33, at 190.
74 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969) (emphasis supplied). Elsewhere in its
opinion, the Scofield Court reiterated its belief that the enforcement of a proper union
rule "by reasonable fines does not constitute the restraint or coercion proscribed by §
8(b)(1)(A)." Id. at 436.
Although the Supreme Court had not discussed the "reasonableness" requirement in
its 1968 decision in Marine Workers, this omission was easily explained bythe fact that
Marine Workers involved only expulsion. Therefore, considerations relevant to fine
situations were not pertinent.
75 Booster Lodge 405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the union threatens or actually attempts court enforce-
ment of the fine, may be coercive and restraining within
the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A).
7 6
This same interpretation of the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield deci-
sions was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its Morton Salt
opinion.7 7 Nevertheless, in Boeing, the Supreme Court curiously
rejected the clear implications of its prior decisions.
The Boeing Court recognized the logic underlying the con-
tention that the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield opinions had implicitly
indicated that the imposition of an unreasonably large union fine
would constitute an unfair labor practice. 7 However, it reasoned
that "[t]his interpretation . . .permissible as it may be, is only
dicta, since in both Allis-Chalmers and in Scofield the reasonable-
ness of the fines was assumed. ' 9 It then proceeded to reject the
earlier precedents' implications. The Court interpreted Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield as placing "fines not affecting the em-
ployer-employee relationship" outside the scope of section
8(b)(1)(A) because "Congress had not intended by enacting this
section to regulate the internal affairs of unions to the extent
that would be required in order to base unfair labor practice
charges on the levying of such fines."80
Although the Labor Board had disingenuously attempted in
its Arrow Development decision to reconcile its position on the
reasonableness issue with the recurrent reference in the Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield opinions to reasonable fines,81 the Supreme
71 Id. at 1156-57. Since it is the statutory obligation of the NLRB to resolve all of the
issues relevant to an unfair labor practice proceeding before it, the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that the Labor Board must consider the reasonableness question where it is
appropriately raised. Id. at 1157. See NLRA §§ 10(a)-(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(a)-(c) (1970)
(NLRB 's unfair labor practice responsibility).
77 Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1972). See O'Reilly v.
NLRB, 472 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972).
" NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 72 (1973).7 91d.
"°Id. at 73.
81 Machinists Lodge No. 504, 185 N.L.R.B. 365, 368 (1970):
Thus the Court's findings that the fines in those cases [Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield] were reasonable seems directed to enforcing courts, encouragin those
courts to make an independent determination of the reasonableness of te fine
in each case presented in the same fashion as courts limit other union discipline
which imposes a severe hardship. Such considerations are of an equitable nature
rather than of the character of restraint and coercion with which the National
Labor Relations Acts treats.
The only possible support for this anomalous interpretation of the Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield decisions' frequent emphasis upon reasonable fines is derived from an oblique
reference in a footnote in Allis-Chalmers "that the state courts, in reviewing the imposition
of union discipline, find ways to strike down 'discipline [which] involves a severe
hardship.'" 388 U.S. at 193 n.32. While this analysis may not be wholly absurd, see Note,
supra note 33, at 1097, such a passing reference in a footnote should not be so seized
upon to negate the frequent textual references in both the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
decisions to the necessity of having reasonable fines. Apparently the Supreme Court
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Court refused to utilize such a questionable formula.8 2 It re-
jected the implications contained in the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
dicta in favor of policy considerations which it believed sup-
ported a contrary result. Since the conclusion reached by the
Boeing Court constitutes a significant departure from the prece-
dents established in the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield decisions, an
evaluation of these policy considerations is in order.
B. Implications of the Legislative History
In supporting its conclusion that section 8(b)(1)(A) was not
intended by Congress to obligate the Labor Board to evaluate
the reasonableness of union fines in unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings, the Boeing Court reiterated much of the analysis of
legislative history which had been utilized in Allis-Chalmers.83
From this evaluation, the Court determined that "Congress had
not intended by enacting this section to regulate the internal
affairs of unions to the extent that would be required in order to
base unfair labor practice charges on the levying of such [un-
reasonable] fines."'84 However, the Court's reliance upon the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA
to support its "reasonableness" determination proves too much.
Even a cursory examination of the literal language con-
tained in section 8(b)(1)(A) 85 discloses an explicit contradiction
between the main portion of that section and its proviso.86 This
agreed. See note 82 infra. However, in Note, Determining the Reasonableness of Fines Imposed
On Union Members: The Role of NLRB, 1973 DuKE L.J. 328, 331 n.22 [hereinafter cited as
Reasonableness of Fines], the author attempts to support the Labor Board's position by
suggesting that the reasonableness references in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield "could refer to
the procedures for imposing the fines and the purposes for which the fines are imposed,
as opposed to the amount of the fine."
82 The Boeing Court expressly noted the unique rationalization of the Labor Board.
412 U.S. at 76 n.1l. The conspicuous absence of any indication of support for the
NLRB's theory negates any inference that the Boeing Court concurred in the Labor
Board's analysis.
83 412 U.S. at 73-74. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
84412 U.S. at 73. The Boeing Court thus eschewed a literal interpretation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) in favor of a statutory construction founded upon policy considerations, just as
it had previously done in Altis-Chalmers, Marine Workers and Scofield.
Not surprisingly, when presented with a choice between literalism in statu-
tory construction and public policy implementation, the Supreme Court chose
the latter course. In all three opinions [Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers & Scofield]
the Court recognized that the decisional key is more appropriately found in the
underlying legislative purpose than in a literal construction of the legislative
text, which may have been directed toward a different area of congressional
concern.
Silard, supra note 33, at 193 (1969).
85 For the text of § 8(b)(1)(A), see note 4 supra.
86 See Kovarsky, Union Discipline, 19 LAB. L.J. 667, 669, 671 (1968). "Conflict is
inevitable because a member cannot be restrained or coerced; yet, restraint or coercion is
inevitable if a union is legislatively authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to
govern its members." Id. 669.
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conflict was recognized by Senator Hatch during the debates
surrounding the proposed Taft-Hartley Act.
It appears to me that by prohibiting unions from inter-
fering with the employees' exercise of their rights relat-
ing to the selection of representatives, and in the next
sentence stating that such a prohibition shall not impair
the right of a union to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership,
we are outlining the boundaries of a legalistic battlefield
which may lead to unlimited argument.
87
While it is certainly appropriate to examine the legislative history
pertaining to the Taft-Hartley amendments in an effort to re-
solve the obvious interpretive dilemma, 88 it must be concluded
that the Supreme Court's evaluation of the congressional de-
bates, as they pertain to the reasonableness issue, is not sup-
ported by anything in the legislative history. Since the Boeing
Court's legislative analysis was almost exclusively premised upon
the earlier Allis-Chalmers consideration of the congressional de-
bates concerning the Taft-Hartley amendments, we are re-
manded to an examination of the Allis-Chalmers decision in this
regard.8 9
The Allis-Chalmers Court recognized the dearth of legislative
debates concerning the propriety of union disciplinary activity,
but it nevertheless concluded:
[w]hat legislative materials there are dealing with
§ 8(b)(1)(A) contain not a single word referring to the
application of its prohibitions to traditional internal
union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in par-
ticular. On the contrary there are a number of assur-
ances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to
regulate the internal affairs of unions. 90
87 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENO RELATIONS ACT, 1947
at 1479 (1948). Concerning Professor Cox' prediction of heavy litigation before thee
ambiguities of § 8(b)(1)(A) could be resolved, see note 6 supra & accompanying text.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1967); NatonaWood-
work Mfrs. As'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619-20 (1967); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639,
362 U.S. 274, 292 (1960). See also text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
89 It should be noted at least parenthetically that the Boeing Court's heavy reliance
upon the legislative analysis contained in the Allis-Chalmers opinion may have been wholly
inappropriate, due to the fact that the Allis-Chalmers decision only interpreted the
congressional debates to permit "reasonable fines." See notes 69-74 supra & accompanying
text. Under these circumstances, since the Boeing Court expressly rejected the implica-
tions contained in the Allis-Chalmers dicta concerning reasonableness of fines, see notes
78-80 supra & accompanying text, it is somewhat incongruous to find that the primary
support for the Boeing conclusion is derived from the Allis-Chalmers decision. Nonetheless,
it is still informative to consider the legislative history in an effort to resolve the ambiguity
which is inherent in § 8(b)(1)(A).
90 388 U.S. at 185-86.
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This sweeping conclusion is defective for at least two major
reasons. 9 First, much of the legislative material which it relied
upon to support its theory that Congress did not intend to
regulate the internal affairs of unions was derived from the
debates surrounding section 8(b)(2). 92 This section ,was clearly
aimed solely at protecting workers from union restraints upon
their external employment rights. It is apparent from the unam-
biguous language of this provision that it was not intended to
affect matters of wholly internal union concern, for it only
proscribes union activity aimed at causing an employer-i.e., an
external party-to discriminate against an employee with respect
to his terms and conditions of employment. Second, despite the
fact that some of the legislative comments pertaining to section
8(b)(1)(A) indicated a general congressional intent to avoid inter-
ference with the internal affairs of labor organizations,93 there is
no real evidence that Congress intended to provide unions with
carte blanche over the area of member discipline. 94 This is
particularly true with respect to fines which the disciplining
union contemplates enforcing in court collection suits.95 "The
admitted fact that Congress did not wish to regulate the internal
operation of a union does not, of itself, sustain a conclusion that
any act resulting from some phase of those internal operations if
[sic] left free from any restriction. ' '96 Furthermore, the mere
presence in the legislative history of several oblique references to
the desire of some Congressmen to avoid interference with
internal union affairs should not be unhesitatingly seized upon
as an indication of general congressional intent to permit labor
organizations to enforce excessively large disciplinary fines.
97
91 It should also be pointed out that an interesting anomaly which was never
satisfactorily explained by the Allis-Chalmers Court concerns its implicit assumption that
court enforcement of union disciplinary fines involves only "internal union affairs,"
despite the invocation of the assistance of the clearly external judicial machinery. Cf.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Christensen, supra note 33, at 271.
92 388 U.S. at 184-85, 190. See Christensen, supra note 33, at 271. Concerning the
applicability of § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), see note 23 supra. For text of §
8(b)(2), see note 114 infra.
93See 388 U.S. at 185-89. See also note 30 supra.
94 This fact was clearly recognized by the Supreme Court itself in Marine Workers,
where the Court found a § 8(b)(1)(A) violation when a labor organization expelled a
member for failing to exhaust all available internal union procedures before filing an
unfair labor practice charge with the Labor Board. Not even the express language of the
proviso permitted such union activity. See also notes 3 8-54 supra & accompanying text.
9"1]t is one thing to state that the 1947 amendments left the union free to levy
fines, but it is quite a different matter to state that enforcement of those fines by
nonunion tribunals was thereby also left free from restriction." Christensen, supra note
33, at 271.
96 d. See also Atleson, sup-a note 33, at 698.
97 The difficulty of ascertaining the specific legislative intent pertaining to a particu-
lar provision from the passing comments of a -few Congressmen should be readily
apparent. Such interpretive statements may well not reflect the attitudes of the overall
legislative body.
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Since an examination of the relevant legislative history98
does not really provide any meaningful indication of the true
congressional intent concerning the applicability of section
8(b)(1)(A) to unreasonably large disciplinary fines which a union
contemplates enforcing through court action, 99 it would be
beneficial to examine the general policies underlying the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act amendments. In this manner, it
may be possible to discern the interpretation which Congress
most likely intended.
C. Concern for Individual Rights Protected by the NLRA
"One of the major aims of the Wagner Act of 1935 was to
protect industrial rights of individual employees."'00 However,
much of the protection afforded workers was provided through
the vehicle of organizational strength-to the derogation of
individual freedom in some cases.' 0' To insure that individual
rights could not become totally subjugated to organizational
objectives, the 1947 Congress included a clause in the Taft-
Hartley amendment to section 7 of the NLRA which expressly
recognized the right of individual employees to refrain from any
and all of the concerted activities protected by that provision.'
0 2
"To protect the right to refrain from concerted activity, Con-
gress enacted Section 8(b)(1)(A) .... Since it is well estab-
9Although the Allis-Chalmers Court also placed some reliance upon the enactment of
the Landrum-Griffin Act as an indication of Congressional belief in 1959 that the prior
Taft-Hartley amendments had not imposed any restrictions upon the internal affairs of
labor organizations, 388 U.S. at 193-95, one commentator has noted:
Any suggestion that section 101(a)(5) of the 1959 act bars all applications of
section 8(b)(1)(A) . . . is dispelled by section 103 of the 1959 act: "Nothing
contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a
labor organization under any State or Federal law ..... Thus on closer
inspection the proscription of court-enforceable union fines under section
8(b)(1)(A) is not incompatible with the 1959 legislation.
Note, supra note 33, at 65. See also Atleson, supra note 33, at 725; Christensen, supra note
33, at 272.
119It is not difficult to understand ,the lack of le ,slative debate concerning the
propriety of court-enforced union fines. "Since cour enrcement of union fines is rare,
one would expect that a search through the legislative history would be unrewarding."
Atleson, sup-a note 33, at 701. For further criticism of the questionable evaluation of
l sativ history by the Allis-Chalmers Court, see id. 701. 706-11; Christensen, supra note
100 Atleson, supra note 33, at 682.
101 See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956) (union waiver
of right of employees to strike); NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953)
(union waiver of right of employees to refuse to cross lawfulpicket line); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (loss of right to contract with employer
individually where bargaining representative has been selected); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 332 (1944) (same).
10
2 See note 5 supra. "Thus, the pre-1947 bias in favor of concerted activity has been
modified in that individual employees have countervailing rights protected by the
statute." Atleson, sup-a note 33, at 685. See also NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970)
(recognizing the right of workers to preseno grievances in their individual capacity in
some cases).103 Atleson, supra note 33, at 684.
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lished that an employee does not automatically waive his section
7 rights and the protection of section 8(b)(1)(A) when he joins a
labor organization, 0 4 it is apparent that the right of a union to
impose disciplinary measures upon a member, which was recog-
nized in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, must be balanced against the
correlative freedom of the individual to abstain from organiza-
tional activity.
Even the Scofield Court recognized that "if the [union disci-
plinary] rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the
labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expul-
sion, without violating § 8(b)(1).' 1 0 5 Although the Allis-Chalmers
and Scofield decisions have provided a labor organization with an
appropriately expansive authority to impose discipline where
necessary to preserve its viability as the employee's selected
bargaining representative,' 0 6 the specific emphasis of those opin-
ions upon the reasonable character of permissible disciplinary
fines' 0 7 should not be casually disregarded at the expense of
individual rights.
The imposition of a reasonable fine upon a member who has
engaged in some activity in violation of a legitimate union rule
protects the labor organization as an institution, while only
derogating from individual freedom to the extent necessary to
further the congressional objective of enhancing the efficacy of
the chosen bargaining representative. However, where an, exces-
sive fine is levied, and judicial enforcement is threatened or
actually commenced, the union's behavior is no longer merely
protective, but becomes retributive. While such punitive action
may certainly have the very undesirable effect of wholly deter-
ring the future exercise of secoion 7 rights by the disciplined
individual, "[flar greater is the repressive effect it may have on
all other members of the union who witness its use."' 0 8 Such an
unreasonable disciplinary measure could thus preclude the exer-
104 See, e.g., NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968). See
also International Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th
Cir. 1971); Local 138, IUOE, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964).
105 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969).
[Section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which
reflects a legitimate union inoerest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in
the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free
to leave the union and escape the rule.
Id. at 430.
106 Such union autonomy is certainly proper to further the legislative objectives
underlying the NLRA, since "[o]verzealous judicial interference could weaken a union in
its capacity of bargaining representative, a role for which it has been delegated Congres-
sional power." At eson, supra note 33, at 686.
1
07 See nooes 69-77 supra & accompanying text.
10s Summers, supra note 16, at 1050.
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cise of protected rights by union members for a substantial
period of time. Not only would this result be unnecessary to
protect the legitimate authority of the labor organization, but it
would negate the important congressional emphasis upon indi-
vidual freedom evidenced by the Taft-Hartley amendment to
section 7 of the NLRA.
10 9
The Boeing Court's belief that state courts may review the
reasonableness of disciplinary fines in collection actions" does
not detract from the extreme coerciveness of an unreasonably
large fine at the time of its imposition.
The levy of a fine is calculated- to force an indi-
vidual both to pay money and to engage in particular
conduct against his will. This is true regardless of the
ultimate collectability of the fine. A man who is held up
at gunpoint is coerced whether or not the gun is loaded.
As with the levy of a fine, the coercion lies in the
calculated threat and .. . the 'argument that the fines
imposed were not collectable in a court of law, even if
accepted is beside the point.' The imposition of a fine
has immediate coercive consequences. Faced with the
possibility of action against him, the employee may well
be, for practical purposes, impelled to forego his statu-
tory right[s] . . . rather than risk involvement in a
lawsuit whose outcome he cannot predict. Or, should he
choose to take that risk, he will find it necessary to hire
counsel whose services he ordinarily would not
require."'
It is apparent that if the protection expressly afforded to
individual employees in section 8(b)(1)(A) and the Taft-Hartley
amendment to section 7 is to be meaningfully effectuated, the
Labor Board will have to examine the coerciveness of excessive
disciplinary fines in unfair labor practice proceedings."
12
This pragmatic approach to the problem of internal
union discipline [would do] much to reconcile the rights
of union members with the need for effective union
authority. It [would allow] unions to effectively enforce
109 See note 102 supra & accompanying text.
110 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1973).
"I Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 381 (1970).
112 "The broad theory in Marine & Shipbuilding [and Scofield] that no lawful discipline
may frustrate a policy imbedded in the labor laws seems to support a determination that
the Board will have to consider whether union fines are reasonable." Johannesen,
Disciplinary Fines as Interference With Protected Rights: Section 8(b)(1)(A), 24 LAB. L.J. 268,
280 (1973).
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their legitimate rules without destroying their members'
rights to refrain from participating in union activities. 113
Furthermore, other policies emanating from the NLRA indicate
the need for such an approach.
D. Other Policy Considerations Evidenced in the NLRA
1. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)
Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA 1 4 prohibits a union from
interfering with the employment relationship which exists be-
tween an individual worker and his employer. Both the Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield decisions specifically recognized that this
provision proscribes "enforcement of a union's internal regula-
tions to affect a member's employment status." 1 5 Although it is
obvious that this section prevents a labor organization from
attempting to enforce disciplinary action by inducing, or at-
tempting to induce, the termination or suspension of the
"' Recent Decisions, 6 GA. L. REv. 631, 643 (1972).
114 Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership ".
Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless
following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one
year preceding the effecoive date of such agreement, the Board shall have
certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election
have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an
agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the
employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other
members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condi-
tion of acquiring or retaining membership ...
11 See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184 (1967).
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member in question by his employer, 1 6 its implications should
have further application to the area of union discipline.
When a labor organization imposes a disciplinary fine which
is so excessively large that it substantially surpasses the level
necessary to deter violations of legitimate union rules, the effect
of this action-to the extent a reasonable limit is exceeded-is
quite analogous to an employment suspension." 7 Although this
situation technically would not come within the purview of
section 8(b)(2i, since the union would not be attempting to cause
the employer himself to affect the member's employment status,
such unreasonable activity would be violative of the important
policy considerations underlying that provision. Irresponsible
union disciplinary action should not be accepted by the mere
exaltation of form over substance, for "[w]hile unions have the
right to enforce their internal rules, they cannot do so by
imposing what amounts to the financial equivalent ofjob loss."",,
Since it is clear that "[tihe NLRB and the courts will intervene if
the discipline affects the employer-employee relationship,"' 1 9 it
would be inappropriate for the Labor Board and the courts to
abdicate this responsibility in the union discipline area merely
because the labor organization's actions do not satisfy the express
language of section 8(b)(2). Otherwise, the vital policy considera-
tions evidenced by that provision will not be fully effectuated.
2. The Duty of Fair Representation
In upholding the disciplinary fines involved in the Scofield
case, the Supreme Court expressly indicated that there was "no
dereliction by the union of its duty of fair representation."'120
The apparent implication of this determination is that invidious
union disciplinary action would be considered contrary to the
established fair representation doctrine.
Although Allis-Chalmers specifically indicated that no fair
representation issue was presented in that case,' 2' it is informa-
tive to note that it nonetheless discussed the general rationale of
that doctrine.
It was because the national labor policy vested
116 Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced pe curiam, 196 F.2d 500
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952). See also Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17 (1954).
117 See Gould, supra note 33, at 1090.
118 Recent Decisions, supra note 113, at 642. See Silard, supra note 33, at 191.
119 Harrison, Union Discipline and the Employer-Employee Relationship, 22 LAB. L.J. 216,
217 (1971).
120 394 U.S. at 436.
121388 U.S. at 195.
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unions with power to order the relations of employees
with their employer that this Court found it necessary to
fashion the duty of fair representation. That duty 'has
stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct
against individuals stripped of traditional forms of re-
dress by the provisions of federal labor law." 22
The important policy considerations underlying the duty of fair
representation should have particular significance with respect to
the propriety of union disciplinary action. This is due to the fact
that probably no area of labor organization activity affects the
union-member relationship more directly than the imposition of
union discipline.
Under the fair representation doctrine, "the exclusive
agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a desig-
nated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of
all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and
to avoid arbitrary conduct."'123 Although "[a] breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,"' 24 an unreasonably
large disciplinary fine arguably violates this doctrine.
25
A fine which is not reasonably related to the disciplining
labor organization's right to protect its vitality as the recognized
bargaining representative should be regarded as retaliatory and
arbitrary, in the same manner any fine imposed upon a member
who has filed a decertification petition is so regarded.126 An
excessively large fine is retributive, rather than defensive. As
such, it should be viewed as an arbitrary and invidious form of
union pressure aimed at deterring the exercise of protected
rights by its members. Such a clear derogation of union respon-
sibility vis-a-vis its members should therefore be found to consti-
tute the type of activity which "frustrates an overriding policy of
the labor laws"127-- the duty of fair representation. This type of
unreasonable discipline should therefore be determined to vio-
late section 8(b)(1)(A). 23
1221d. at 181, quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
123 Vaca v. Sipes, 3 86 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
12 41d. at 190.
125See Note, supra note 33, at 1097.
120See notes 43-51 supra & accompanying text.
127%Cf Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969).
128 he Labor Board has clearly recognized that arbitrary and invidious union
conduct is violative of § 8(b)(1)(A). See, e.g., Rubber Workers, Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12, 15 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140
N.L.R.B. 181, 190 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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3. The Impropriety of "Reverse Preemption"
In its Boeing decision, the Supreme Court placed great
emphasis upon its belief that state courts would evaluate the
reasonableness of disciplinary fines in collection suits. 129 It noted
that "[s]ince state courts will have jurisdiction to determine.
reasonableness in the enforcement context in any event, the
Board's independent determination of reasonableness in an un-
fair labor practice context might well yield a conflict when the
two forums are called upon to review the same fine." 130 To
obviate such a problem, the Court concluded that the question of
reasonableness should not be cognizable before the NLRB. Such
reasoning not only is contrary to the express jurisdictional au-
thority of the Labor Board, but constitutes a substantial depar-
ture from prior Supreme Court decisions pertaining to federal
preemption in the area of labor relations.
Section 10(a) of the NLRA 131 specifically provides:
The Board is empowered ... to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise ....
Although this language was originally enacted as part of the
Wagner Act in 1935, Congress in 1947 expressly indicated why
the Taft-Hartley Act did not alter this provision.
By retaining the language which provides the Board's
powers under section 10 shall not be affected by other
means of adjustment, the conference agreement makes
clear that, when two remedies exist, one before the
Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the
Board shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other
remedies.'
32
In NLRB v. Strong, 133 the Supreme Court itself noted that "the
business of the Board, among other things, is to adjudicate and
remedy unfair labor practices,' 34 and it recognized that the
express language of section 10(a) indicates a clear congressional
intention that the Labor Board's jurisdiction is not to be di-
129 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 76 (1973).
130 Id. at 77-78.
131 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
132 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947).
133 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
'
3 4 Id. at 360,
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minished by the fact that it is called upon to resolve contract
questions which could be adjudicated before other forums. 135
In light of the clear legislative intent expressed in section
10(a), which prior Supreme Court decisions specifically recog-
nized, the Boeing conclusion is most curious. The Court's com-
plete failure to explicate the reasons for its departure from
recognized precedents makes it impossible to discern any ra-
tional basis for its action, apart from the obvious fact that the
Court desired to achieve a particular result. Furthermore, the
Court's reasoning is diametrically opposed to the principles un-
derlying the well-established federal preemption doctrine.
The course of events that eventuated in the enact-
ment of a comprehensive national labor law, entrusted
for its administration and development to a centralized,
expert agency, as well as the very fact of that enactment
itself, reveals that a primary factor in this development
was the perceived incapacity of common-law courts and
state legislatures, acting alone, to provide an informed
and coherent basis for stabilizing labor relations conflict
and for equitably and delicately structuring the balance
of power among competing forces so as to further the
common good.'
36
To effectuate these vital considerations, the Supreme Court has
enunciated the so-called Garmon doctrine:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are pro-
tected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due re-
gard for the federal enactment requires that state juris-
diction must yield . . . When an activity is arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive cometence
of the National Labor Relations Board ....
Since the Garmon doctrine was unequivocally reaffirmed in
13
5 
Id.
136 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971). See Teamsters
Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91
(1953).
137 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). See
generally Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Hays,
Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 959 (1954); Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 6,
269 (1959); Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 641 (1961); Updegraff, Preemption, Predictability and Progress in Labor Law, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 473 (1966); Wellington, Labor and the Fedal System, 26 U. CI. L. REv. 542
(1959).
UNION DISCIPLINARY FINES
the Supreme Court's 1971 Lockridge decision,138 it is extremely
difficult to justify the Boeing Court's reasoning that Labor Board
jurisdiction must yield to state tribunals with respect to the
reasonableness issue. 139 Although the Court has recognized that
state forums need not surrender jurisdiction
where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral
concern of the Labor Management Relations Act . . .
[o]r where the regulated conduct touche[s] interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in
the absence of compelling Congressional direction, we
could not infer that Congress had deprived the states of
the power to act,' 40
neither of these preemption corollaries can satisfactorily explain
the Boeing Court's decision to divest the Labor Board ofjurisdic-
tion over the reasonableness area.
The imposition of unreasonably large disciplinary fines has
the impermissible effect of deterring the exercise of protected
section 7 rights by members.' 4 ' Such action further offends the
important legislative policies which precipitated the enactment of
sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA142 and which underlie
the duty of fair representation. 143 Under these circumstances it is
clear that the propriety of excessively large union fines is not "a
merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations
Act."
Although the traditional concern of state courts with the
reasonableness issue in collection actions may well indicate the
appropriateness of concurrent jurisdiction over this area, 144 this
would certainly not derogate from the statutory authority of the
NLRB. 45 Even where state tribunals are permitted to adjudicate
138 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The
Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972). Cf. St. AntoineJudicial
'Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
269, 286-87 (1973).
139 It is interesting to note that even if the Boeing Court's belief that Congress did not
intend in 1947 to regulate the internal affairs of labor organizations were correct, this
would certainly not automatically provide state tribunals with the authority to consider
the reasonableness of union disciplinary fines. The Court should have considered the
possibility that Congress did not desire to permit any regulation of this area of union
concern. Cf. Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). "[T]he State is not merely
filling a gap when it outlaws what federal law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an
economic contest a weapon that Congress [may have] meant him to have available."
Lesnick, supra note 138, at 478. See Cox, supra note 138, at 1365.
'San Diego Bldg. Trades Council V. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
141 See notes 100-13 supra & accompanying text.
4' See notes 114-19 supra & accompanying text.
i143 See notes 120-28 supra & accompanying text.
i44 See notes 179-87 infra & accompanying text.
i45See notes 131-35 supra & accompanying text.
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issues which may be relevant to unfair labor practice proceedings
before the Labor Board, it is well recognized that this in no way
detracts from the plenary jurisdiction of the federal agency.
146
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH THE Boeing HOLDING
Under the doctrine enunciated in Boeing members of labor
organizations upon whom disciplinary fines are imposed may
anticipate many difficulties which were either ignored or miscon-
ceived by the Supreme Court. A brief consideration of the more
apparent problems which have been created may hopefully pro-
vide the impetus for reconsideration of this jurisdictional ques-
tion by the Labor Board or possibly by the Supreme Court.
A. Adequacy of State Court Review of the
Reasonableness of the Amount of a Fine
One of the important considerations which induced the
Boeing Court to conclude that there was no necessity for NLRB
jurisdiction over the question of reasonableness was its belief that
state courts adequately protect the rights of disciplined em-
ployees by reviewing the size of union fines in collection
actions. 147 It emphasized its notion that "state courts applying
state law are quite willing to determine whether disciplinary fines
are reasonable in amount."'148 However, the Supreme Court's
impression of state court activity in this area is generally not
supported by the facts.
Although union fines are generally enforced through the
threat of expulsion, there are occasions where this tactic does not
intimidate the disciplined member and the labor organization is
compelled to seek court enforcement in a collection suit.149 The
state tribunals will frequently consider the underlying reason for
the union's disciplinary action before granting enforcement of
the fine, 150 but they often ignore the reasonableness of the
punishment which has been meted out.' 5' Therefore, so long as
146 NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969). See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502 (1962).
147412 U.S. at 76-77.
14 8Id. at 76. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193 n.32 (1967).149 See Atleson, supra note 33, at 697, 724; Christensen, supra note 33, at 269-70;
Note, Judicial Enforcement of Union Disciplinary Fines, 76 YALE L.J. 563 (1967).
5'0 "Courts' responses to union discipline vary markedly, depending on the conduct
for which punishment is imposed." Summers, Courts, supra note 9, at 198.
151 The limits which the courts have placed on union discipline seem to have no
relation to the severity of the penalty imposed, but are instead governed by the
conduct which the union has sought to punish and the procedure used for
determining the member's guilt.
Id. 179.
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the labor organization in question has imposed the disciplinary
fine for the violation of a legitimate union rule, many state courts
will simply refuse to consider the disciplined member's plea that
he is being forced to suffer unreasonable retribution. The Boeing
decision will thus permit unions in those jurisdictions to utilize
the threat of unreasonably burdensome punishment to restrain
members from engaging in activities protected by the NLRA
which might arguably be contrary to some union rule. Without
the hope of Labor Board intervention to prevent the use of
excessively onerous discipline, the possibility that members will
be forced to forgo the exercise of express statutory rights is
obviously quite real.
B. Lack of Uniform Standards
Even those union members who are fortunate enough to
reside in jurisdictions whose tribunals will examine the reason-
ableness of disciplinary fines in collection actions will face imped-
iments should they contemplate the exercise of protected rights
which might conflict with union obligations. Due to the lack of
consistency among courts of even the same state, individuals will
be unable to predict how a tribunal would react to a penalty
threatened by their union. The reason for these intrajurisdic-
tional inconsistencies is explicable:
Faced with cases of unjust discipline, courts frequently
give clauses in union constitutions a strained construc-
tion. Although, as a practical matter, the protection of
members may sometimes be adequate, it does not result
from established standards of fairness, but rather from
state judges consciously preventing abuse of union dis-
cipline. Such result-oriented jurisprudence produces in-
consistent rules and results and impairs predictability. A
union member does not know what protections will be
afforded him by a particular judge in a particular
jurisdiction.152
Furthermore, due to the vastly different standards of reason-
ableness utilized by courts of different states, substantial in-
equities will be created for employees who exercise their NLRA
rights in disregard of union warnings. "The courts, in deciding
union discipline cases, have produced a bewildering tangle of
inconsistent rules and results. This mass of contradictions is
more than a difference of opinions among various courts, for a
15
2 Note, supra note 33, at 1101.
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court will frequently evade even its own rules and
precedents."'
53
This unpredictability renders it virtually impossible for an
individual to calculate beforehand the amount of discipline
which he might have to suffer should he undertake a particular
course of action in violation of union rules. The likelihood that
this unpredictability will compel him to refrain entirely from his
contemplated action is clear. 154 Furthermore, since the courts of
different states utilize vastly divergent standards to determine
the reasonableness of union fines, 55 there is a very real possibil-
ity that members of the same union may -suffer very different
penalties for engaging in identical conduct.156 Such an inequita-
ble situation would certainly be contrary to the frequently ex-
pressed desire for uniformity in national labor policy.' 57
C. The Expense of Litigation
Judicial protection against oppressive union disci-
pline is meaningful only to the extent that effective
remedies are practically available. Measuring the effec-
tiveness of remedies in practical terms requires close
scrutiny of . . . the costs of litigation.' 58
When an individual files an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB and that agency issues a complaint, the charging party
is subsequently represented by the General Counsel's office at no
expense to himself. Thus, were the issue of reasonableness
cognizable before the Labor Board, disciplined union members
would not have to forgo a challenge to an unreasonably excessive
fine due to the fear of incurring substantial legal fees. However,
under the Boeing decision, a disciplined member may only liti-
gate the reasonableness question as a defense to a collection suit
153 Summers, supra note 16, at 1050. See Summers, Courts, suI*a note 9, at 184:
"[Plast practice is ignored or rejected; and prior court decisions interpreting similar
clauses are not precedents."
154 h only manner in which such an individual could undertake the action he is
considering without the fear of unreasonably excessive union discipline would be for him
first to resign from the labor orgniztion. Lee NLRB v. Granite State joint Bd., Textile
Workers Union, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). However, this would require him to forgo the right
to participate in union affairs, and it might additionally mean the forfeiture of valuable
monetary benefits, such as pension and welfare rights, which are perquisites of member-
ship. Atleson, sup-a note 33, at 716.
156 Even though the union might well impose identical fines on all members who
have engaged in the same activity, the divergence of state standards will cause some
courts to enforce the entire fine, while others may either sustain a slightly reduced
amount or require a substantial reduction as a prerequisite to collection.
'" Note, supra note 33, at 1102.
158 Summers, Courts, supra note 9, at 212.
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by his labor organization, and the expense of such recourse may
be prohibitive.
Professor Summers' extensive study of union discipline has
disclosed that many disciplined individuals never challenge the
amount of union fines due to their inability to afford the neces-
sary legal fees. 159 They are wage earners who must finance their
litigation out of what meager savings they have accumulated,
while the adversary labor organization has a substantial treasury
which permits it to utilize costly procedural maneuvers and
extended appeals to exhaust the individual's resources. 60 "The
danger that the legal rights of a disciplined member will go by
default because of the cost of asserting them in court is obvious
.... ,,161 Therefore, absent the availability of Labor Board relief
in cases of excessive discipline, labor organizations are left free
to utilize unreasonably harsh measures to deter effectively the
meaningful exercise of NLRA rights by their members. It is most
doubtful that either the Taft-Hartley Congress or the Allis-
Chalmers Court ever intended to permit such a negation of
individual rights.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. Labor Board Responsibility
If the important individual rights which are expressly
guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA are to be protected against
diminution through the imposition of excessively large union
disciplinary fines, the reasonableness of such discipline must be
subject to challenge in Labor Board unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings. Although the "[p]otential responsibility for examining
the reasonableness of all fines is a frightening prospect to a
Board which is already worried about its work load,"' 62 this
should not negate the Labor Board's statutory obligation in this
important area. "[P]articularly Scofield, as well as Allis-Chalmers
and Marine Workers, admonishes the Board not to abdicate its
responsibility to limit discipline which is offensive to public policy
where penalties are involved.' 63
..9 See id. 222: "The very fact that so few cases involve individuals unsupported by
factional groups suggests that the lone member's rights go by default, and many lawyers
frankly admitted that they would not take a case unless it was backed by a substantial
group." See Summers, supra note 16, at 1095.
60 Summers, Courts, supra note 9, at 221.
161 1d. 220.
162 Reasonableness of Fines, supra note 81, at 332 n.27. See Fanning, Can We Make the
NLRB Work More Effectively?, 23 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 101 (1971). See also Adeson,
supra note 33, at 723.
113 Gould, supra note 33, at 1137.
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The Labor Board has not evaluated the reasonableness of
union disciplinary fines, but it has had experience with the
reasonableness of union exactions in a related area. Under
section 8(b)(5) of the NLRA, 164 the NLRB is required to deter-
mine whether initiation fees required by labor organizations
pursuant to union-security agreements are excessive.' 65 The fact
that section 8(b)(1)(A) does not provide the Labor Board with
specific standards to be applied to determine the reasonableness
of union disciplinary fines, while section 8(b)(5) does mention
several standards, 66 should not detract from the NLRB's re-
sponsibility under section 8(b)(1)(A). A previous Supreme Court
decision concerning a related NLRA jurisdictional question
stated:
It is true that this forces the Board to exercise . . .
powers which are broad and lacking in rigid standards
to govern their application. But administrative agencies
are frequently given rather loosely defined powers to
cope with problems as difficult as those posed by [un-
reasonable disciplinary fines.] . . . It has had long
experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor
problems. With this experience and a knowledge of the
standards generally used by arbitrators, . . . [state
tribunals,] and others in wrestling with this problem, we
are confident that the Board need not disclaim the
power given it for lack of standards. Experience and
common sense will supply the grounds for the perfor-
mance of this job which Congress has assigned to the
Board.' 67
The Labor Board should establish standards of reasonable-
ness which could be applied uniformly in all situations where
disciplined union members challenge disciplinary fines as being
unreasonably excessive. This would provide members of labor
organizations with the ability to predict the consequences of
contemplated behavior which might be violative of union rules,
164 29 U.S.C.'§ 158(b)(5) (1970) provides that itis an unfair labor practice for a union
(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsec-
tion (a)(3) of this section the payment, as a condition precedent to becoming a
member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board finds
excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances.
For the text of § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), see note 114 supra.165 See, e.g., Longshoremen, ILA, Local 1419, 186 N.L.R.B. 674 (1970) (violation of
§ 8(b)(5)). See also NLRB v. Television Employees, Local 804, 315 F.2d 398 (3d Cir.
1963).
16See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75 n.10 (1973).
167 NLRB v. Radio Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573, 583 (1961). Although this case dealt
specifically with the duty of the Labor Board to resolve jurisdictionar disputes under
§ 10(k) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970), its reasoning is appropriate to the
reasonableness issue. Cf. Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U.
CHi. L. REv. 681 (1972).
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and it would obviate the present practice of having the enforce-
ability of such fines be dependent upon the vagaries of state law.
It would also provide state and federal courts with a set of
uniform standards which they could apply in collection actions to
determine the reasonableness issue, should such tribunals be
granted concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Board.
16 8
B. Standards of Reasonableness
Although no attempt will be made here to discuss the
infinite variety of situations which may involve union disciplinary
fines, a few brief comments concerning appropriate standards of
reasonableness are relevant. The District of Columbia Circuit
noted some pertinent limitations in its Booster Lodge decision: 169
The Board must remember that a fine imposed for
the violation of a legitimate union rule should be viewed
as presumptively protective, and therefore privileged,
when the amount of the fine, taking into account the
character and importance of the ends served by the rule
being enforced, is reasonably related to the need for
protection. On the other hand, if the amount of the fine
is such as to be inordinately disproportionate to the
needed protection, an inference is warranted that the
fine was imposed upon the member, not in vindication
of a legitimate union interest, but rather as a reprisal
for his having exercised a statutorily protected right. In
the latter situation, . . . the fine would be "coercive"
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
When the Taft-Hartley Congress amended the NLRA, it
and the courts were operating under the theory that a contrac-
tual relationship defines the obligations which exist between a
member and his labor organization. 7 0 Since an action to collect a
fine is generally premised upon contractual principles, the
abhorrence of contract law for penalties 17 should be considered.
If a disciplinary fine is clearly retributive, rather than compen-
168 It would also establish uniform standards which arbitrators could utilize in cases
deferred to them by the Labor Board under the Collyer doctrine. See Nabisco, Inc. v.
NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973); Coglyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
See also Revised Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel Nash on Arbitration Deferral Policy
Under Collyer, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP.-LAB. REL. 9031 (1973). See generally Johannesen Z
Smith, Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723 (1972); Note, The NLRB's Arbitration
Deferral Policy Under Collyer: The Impact of National Radio Co., 53 B.U.L. REv. 711 (1973).
169 Booster Lodge 405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1972),rev'd sub
nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
170NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182 (1967); Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958). See Summers, Courts, supra note 9, at 180; Note, supra
note 33, at 1100.
171 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1055-58 (2d ed. 1954); 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 776 (rev. ed. 1936).
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satory or rehabilitative, it should not receive NLRB approval, but
should rather be struck down as yiolative of section 8(b)(1)(A).1
72
The most common circumstances involving the threat of
court-enforced disciplinary fines concern the situation in which
union members have crossed picket lines to work during an
authorized economic strike. Although the trial examiner in the
Booster Lodge case 173 attempted to resolve all of the conflicting
policy considerations in this area by devising a formula where-
under a union fine covering no more than thirty-five percent of
a strikebreaker's straight-time wage earnings and eighty percent
of his overtime or premium pay would be presumptively reason-
able, such a rigid test based almost entirely upon the trial
examiner's own visceral reaction to the strikebreaking situation
should be rejected. It simply has no support, either in the statute
itself, or in its legislative history. The only absolute limitation
which can be supported by resorting to the provisions of the
NLRA is one premised upon the rationale that any disciplinary
fine which exceeds the net earnings derived by the strikebreaker,
less any union strike benefits or general welfare payments he
would have received had he honored the work stoppage, should
be considered to be conclusively unreasonable. This restriction is
based upon the principles which are clearly enunciated in sec-
tions 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 174 which prohibit any
interference by a labor organization with the employment status
of any member, except where he has failed to tender his dues
and fees pursuant to a valid union-security agreement. 175 Since a
union fine which exceeds the net benefits obtained by a member
on account of his strikebreaking is tantamount to a post-strike
work suspension to the extent the fine exceeds such net
earnings' 76 this would violate the congressional concerns under-
lying the enactment of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3).'
77
172See Tri-Rivers Marine Engr's Union, 189 N.L.R.B. 838 (1971); International
Molders, Local 125, 178 N.L.R.B. 208 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971). See
also notes 43-51 supra & accompanying text. /
173 Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970).
1
7 4 See note 114 supra. See also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969); NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).
175 See notes 114-19 supra & accompanying text.
176 See Gould, supra note 33, at 1090.
177 Booster Lodge 405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1159 & n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973). Although the excessive fine
situation does not fit within the express coverage of § 8(b)(2) since the union is not
inducing the employer to discriminate against the employee, this should not prevent the
applicaton of the principles underlying §§ 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3), which the Allis-Chalmers
andl Scofield decisions both recognized. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969);
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967).This suggested limitation comports with the approach which Professors Bok and
Dunlop have proposed . Bo & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY
106-07 (1970). See also Could, supra note 33, at 1124.
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Within this absolute limit, the Labor Board should have no
difficulty in devising an appropriate set of standards to resolve
reasonableness questions. This issue should be determined in
particular cases with reference to the specific circumstances lead-
ing to the imposition of the disciplinary fine. The relative
strength of the labor organization involved and the detrimental
effect of the member's violation upon the effectiveness of the
union as an institution should be considered, along with the
amount of gain, if any, realized by the offending member. The
availability of other effective remedies which would not impose
such a severe hardship as a fine would also be pertinent. Of
course, there are many other similar factors relevant to the
reasonableness issue, but the NLRB is clearly cognizant of them
and capable of developing more specifically the standards in this
area once it has reconsidered its prior conclusion.
78
C. The Preemption Question
Should the Labor Board accept jurisdiction over the reason-
ableness issue, an important question of federal preemption
would arise. The courts would have to determine the extent to
which state and federal tribunals 17 9 would be ousted from juris-
diction.
Under the Garmon preemption doctrine, "[wihen it is clear
or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State pur-
ports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8,
due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdic-
tion must yield."'180 Since it is urged here that the NLRB accept
jurisdiction over the reasonableness issue under its section
8(b)(1)(A) authority, thus rendering this question "arguably sub-
ject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal
courts [would have to] defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board . . . ,"I'l unless countervailing
considerations militate against preemption.
Despite the broad reach of its preemption doctrine, the
178But see Getman & Goldberg, supra note 167.
179 Federal courts would only be able to hear union collection suits where the
diversity jurisdiction prerequisites were satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The $10,000
jurisdictional minimum would probably preclude federal court jurisdiction in most
instances.
181 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). See
generally notes 136-46 supra & accompanying text.
1l 359 U.S. at 245. See Motor Coach Em ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
See also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955); Garner v. Team-
sters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
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Garmon Court recognized that state tribunals need not yield
exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Board "where the regulated
conduct touche[s] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the
States of the power to act."' 82 It is clear that many state tribunals
have been adjudicating internal union disputes for more years
than the NLRB has been in existence.' 8 3 This traditional concern
of state tribunals was expressly noted in the Allis-Chalmers
decision. 84 Under these circumstances, the "traditional state
concern" exception to the Garmon preemption doctrine should
be utilized to permit state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the Labor Board over the question of reasonableness of
union fines.
185
The propriety of union disciplinary fines should not be
dependent upon the vagaries of state law, but should rather be
determined by clear standards promulgated by the Labor
Board.18 6 The application of such uniform NLRB standards in
state court collection suits would insure that the proper balance
which the Labor Board draws between protected individual
rights and the right of labor organizations to regulate their
internal affairs will be preserved. Furthermore, the establish-
ment of such a uniform set of standards which would be applied
in both NLRB and state court proceedings would satisfy the
frequently expressed Supreme Court prerequisite to the applica-
bility of one of the Garmon preemption exceptions: that state
tribunals apply federal substantive law.' 87
Once a relatively complete set of uniform reasonableness
standards has been promulgated by the NLRB and upheld by
the federal courts, there should be no necessity for state courts to
defer to the specific labor expertise and competence of the Labor
182 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
183 Summers, Courts, suPra note 9; Summers, supra note 16. See also NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973).
'
8 4 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193 n.32 (1967).
'
8 5 Gould, supra note 33, at 1133-34; Reasonableness ofFines, supra note 81, at 333-35.
This concurrent jurisdictional approach would be analogous to similar exceptions to
the Garmon doctrine which the Supreme Court has recognized. See, e.t., Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967) (duty of fair representation); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local
114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261
(1964) (arbitration); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (breach of
contract).
M88 See notes 153-57 supra & accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 33, at
1103-07.
187 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174 (1967); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261
(1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). -
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Board"" with respect to ordinary reasonableness questions. In
this area, the existence of pervasive reasonableness standards
would obviate the necessity for deferral by state courts to the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, since resolution of the
reasonableness issues covered by such standards would not in-
volve questions beyond the conventional experience of judges
nor concern determinations requiring particular expertise in the
area of labor law.1 8 9 However, different considerations would be
involved when state courts are presented with unusual reason-
ableness questions.
Where a reasonableness issue is raised in a state court
collection action which cannot practically be resolved through
the direct application of established Labor Board standards, or
which requires the consideration of peculiar labor relations prob-
lems which are not ordinarily within the general competence of
trial judges, state tribunals should defer to the primary jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB whenever possible. 190 This would insure the
resolution of difficult questions by the federal agency which
Congress created to administer the NLRA. Nevertheless, there
may be instances where state court adjudication of such complex
or novel issues would be necessary.
Section 10(b) of the NLRA' 9 ' expressly provides that the
Labor Board only has jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
charges which are filed within six months after they arise. Since a
state statute of limitations may permit the commencement of a
fine collection action by a labor organization two, three or four
years subsequent to the imposition of the discipline involved, it is
188 Cf. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 167.
189 Cf. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684-85 (1965)
(citations omitted):
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body . . . . The
doctrine is based on the principle "that in cases raising issues of fact not within
the conventional experience ofjudges or cases requiring the exercise of adminis-
trative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subjeco matter
should not be passed over," and "requires judicial abstention in cases where
protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to
the agency which administers the scheme."
See also Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1957); Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). See generally Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction,
77 HARv. L. Rav. 1037 (1964); Meltzer, supra note 137.
190 A deferring state court should probably retain the collection action on its docket
pending resolution of the reasonableness question by the Labor Board. It could thereaf-
ter adjudicate the remaining issues in the collection suit. El Dorado Oil Works v. United
States, 328 U.S. 12, 17 (1946); General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co.,
308 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1940).191 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
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apparent that a state tribunal may well be presented with a
situation where deferral to the special competence of the NLRB
would be appropriate but for the fact that the Labor Board's six
month limitation period had expired prior to the institution of
the state court suit.' 92 Under such circumstances, the state court
could dismiss the entire collection action, enforce the fine im-
posed without considering its reasonableness, or itself resolve the
novel reasonableness issue. Since it would not be fair to penalize
the labor organization which has commenced its collection suit
within the applicable statute of limitations period by dismissing
its enforcemeno action, and it would certainly not be appropriate
to ignore the rights of the disciplined individual by enforcing the
fine in toto, the state tribunal should attempt to resolve the
reasonableness question through analogy to available federal
standards. 193 This should not create too much dissonance in the
reasonableness area, and it would permit labor organizations to
enforce reasonable disciplinary measures pursuant to the con-
gressional intent evidenced by the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A).
At the same time it would respect the correlative section
8(b)(1)(A) protection of individual rights. This would certainly be
the best means of resolving a difficult problem, and it would
generally recognize and protect the competing federal interests
involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its recent Boeing decision, the Supreme Court held that
the reasonableness of union disciplinary fines is not relevant to a
section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice proceeding. The Court
indicated its belief that the Labor Board should not interfere
with the traditional activity of state courts in this area, and it
rejected the implications arising from prior Supreme Court dicta
concerning this issue.
The Boeing holding ignores the impermissibly detrimental
effect which unreasonably large union fines may have upon the
exercise of section 7 rights, and it further fails to consider the
important federal labor policies evidenced by sections 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2) and the fair representation doctrine. The Boeing Court
also relied upon equivocal legislative history to accomplish the
192 Since a disciplined union member would generally not fear a fine until the threat
of enforcement became real through the institution of a collection suit, it is apparent that
it would not usually be until this time that an unfair labor practice charge would be filed
with the NLRB.
193 Cf. Gould, supra note 33, at 1134-36.
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exact "reverse preemption" proscribed by section 10(a) of the
NLRA and denounced in prior federal labor preemption deci-
sions of the Supreme Court.
The reasonableness question should be cognizable before
the NLRB in appropriate unfair labor practice proceedings. This
would prevent unwarranted interference by labor organizations
with protected individual rights, while recognizing the estab-
lished authority of unions to impose and enforce reasonable
disciplinary measures in vindication of legitimate internal union
regulations. This suggested approach would also protect indi-
vidual union members who lack the financial resources to litigate
the reasonableness issue in state court collection suits, and it
would ameliorate the present situation whereunder state tribu-
nals either ignore the reasonableness question or resolve it
through the application of contradictory and unpredictable state
standards.
State tribunals should not be preempted from jurisdiction
over the issue of the reasonableness of union fines because of the
proposed Labor Board authority in this area. They should in-
stead be permitted to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, due to the
traditional concern of many state courts with respect to this issue.
The state forums should, however, be required to apply the
uniform standards which the Labor Board promulgates for
resolving reasonableness questions. This would guarantee ade-
quate protection for federally created individual and union
rights, while recognizing the traditional authority of state tribu-
nals over disputes involving internal union matters. This ap-
proach would also be consistent with prior Supreme Court
decisions regarding the preemption doctrine in the area of labor
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